限界事例からの議論
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^ “The catch is that any such characteristic that is possessed by all human beings will not be possessed only by human beings. For example, all human beings, but not only human beings, are capable of feeling pain; and while only human beings are capable of solving complex mathematical problems, not all humans can do this.” (Singer 2015, Chapter 6)
^ Dombrowski 1984.
^ Maehle 1993.
^ Horta 2014, p. 152, Notes.
^ Wilson n.d., The argument from marginal cases (again).
^ Regan 1979.
^ Pluhar 1995.
^ Horta 2014.
^ Rachels 1991.
^ “How should we read Machan’s broken-chair analogy? There is only one coherent way to interpret it. He is arguing that, just as a broken chair still belongs in the category of chairs, a marginal human still belongs in the category of humans. And because marginal humans belong to a species whose normal members can reason, have guilt, be held responsible for their actions ? which Machan previously argued is a necessary condition for having any rights ? the marginal members, too, deserve the same moral protections as those normal members. Here an implied premise lurks: Any member of a species most of whose members are moral agents has the same rights and protections as the normal members of that species. To put it more concisely: The moral status of an individual depends on what is normal for that individual’s species. I will call this the Argument from Species Normality.” (Graham 2004, The argument from species normality)
^ 「argument from species normality」の用語はデイヴィッド・グラハムが提唱した[15]。
^ “… classifications and ascriptions of capacities rely on the good sense of making certain generalizations. One way to show this is to recall that broken chairs, while they aren’t any good to sit on, are still chairs, not monkeys or palm trees. Classifications are not something rigid but something reasonable. While there are some people who either for a little or longer while ? say when they’re asleep or in a coma ? lack moral agency, in general people possess that capacity, whereas non-people don’t. So it makes sense to understand them having rights so their capacity is respected and may be protected. This just doesn’t work for other animals.” (Machan 2004)
^ Graham 2004.
^ Regan & Singer 1989, p. 100.
参考文献
Dombrowski, Daniel A. (1984). “Vegetarianism and the argument from marginal cases in porphyry”. Journal of the History of Ideas（英語版） 45 (1): 141?143. doi:10.2307/2709335. .mw-parser-output cite.citation{font-style:inherit;word-wrap:break-word}.mw-parser-output .citation q{quotes:"\"""\"""'""'"}.mw-parser-output .citation.cs-ja1 q,.mw-parser-output .citation.cs-ja2 q{quotes:"「""」""『""』"}.mw-parser-output .citation:target{background-color:rgba(0,127,255,0.133)}.mw-parser-output .id-lock-free a,.mw-parser-output .citation .cs1-lock-free a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/65/Lock-green.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat}.mw-parser-output .id-lock-limited a,.mw-parser-output .id-lock-registration a,.mw-parser-output .citation .cs1-lock-limited a,.mw-parser-output .citation .cs1-lock-registration a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d6/Lock-gray-alt-2.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat}.mw-parser-output .id-lock-subscription a,.mw-parser-output .citation .cs1-lock-subscription a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/aa/Lock-red-alt-2.svg")right 0.1em center/9px no-repeat}.mw-parser-output .cs1-ws-icon a{background:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4c/Wikisource-logo.svg")right 0.1em center/12px no-repeat}.mw-parser-output .cs1-code{color:inherit;background:inherit;border:none;padding:inherit}.mw-parser-output .cs1-hidden-error{display:none;color:#d33}.mw-parser-output .cs1-visible-error{color:#d33}.mw-parser-output .cs1-maint{display:none;color:#3a3;margin-left:0.3em}.mw-parser-output .cs1-format{font-size:95%}.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-left{padding-left:0.2em}.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-right{padding-right:0.2em}.mw-parser-output .citation .mw-selflink{font-weight:inherit}ISSN 0022-5037.
Dombrowski, Daniel A. (1997). Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases. University of Illinois Press（英語版）. ISBN 978-0-252-06638-2. https://www.press.uillinois.edu/books/?id=p066382
Frey, Raymond G. (1988). Moral standing, the value of lives, and speciesism. 4. Between the Species（英語版）. pp. 191?201. doi:10.15368/bts.1988v4n3.8. ISSN 1945-8487. https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=bts.
Graham, David (2004年). “ ⇒A libertarian replies to Tibor Machan’s ‘Why animal rights don’t exist’”. Strike The Root. 2023年2月21日閲覧。
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