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注釈^ The decision to continue with a frontline biplane fighter, due to the success of the highly maneuverable Fiat CR.32 during the Spanish Civil war was probably one of the most glaring strategic oversights. Another was the mistaken belief that fast bombers need no fighter escort, particularly modern aircraft with radar support.[37]
^ Italian doctrine envisaged a blitzkrieg style approach as early as 1936-8, considerably beyond what most theorists discerned at the time. This stressed massed armour, massed and mobile artillery, action against enemy flanks, deep penetration and exploitation, and the ‘indirect’ approach. Their manuals envisioned M tanks as the core, P tanks as the mobile artillery and reserves for the ‘Ms’ and L tanks. These were to be combined with fast (celere) infantry divisions and forward anti-tank weapons. The Italians were never able to build the armoured divisions described in their manuals ? although they often attempted to mass what they had to make up for the poor performance of some pieces.[38]
^ This was being expedited through the conversion of two passenger liners and the scavenging of parts from other vessels. The SS Roma, converted into the Aquila, received 4-shaft turbine engines scavenged form the unfinished light cruisers Cornelio Silla and Paolo Emilio. She was to have a maximum compliment of 51 Reggiane Re.2001 fighters. The decision to build carries came late. The Aquila was virtually ready by the time of armistice with the Allies in 1943. She was captured by the Germans, who scuttled her in 1945.[42]
^ Fiat G.55, Macchi C.205, & Reggiane Re.2005; Italian fighters build around the Daimler-Benz DB 605 engine.[42]
^ The M13/40s and M14/41s were not (initially) obsolete when they entered service in late 1940/1941. Their operators (in the form of the Ariete and Littoro divisions) met with much unaccredited success. Yet they became obsolescent as the war progressed. It was necessary to maintain production and they suffered unduly as a result of the Italian’s inability to produce a suitable successor in time and in numbers.[46][47][48]
^ In light of the economic difficulties it was proposed, in 1933, by Marshal Italo Balbo to limit the number of divisions to 20 and ensure that each was fully mobile for ready response, equipped with the latest weaponry and trained for amphibious warfare. The proposal was rejected by Mussolini (and senior figures) who wanted large numbers of divisions to intimidate opponents.[52]。To maintain the number of divisions, each became binary, consisting of only 2 regiments, and therefore equating to a British brigade in size. Even then, they would often be thrown into battle with an under strength complement.
出典^ John Keegan, A History of Warfare, Alfred A. Knopf (New York 1993) [ISBN 0-394-58801-0], p.263; David Potter, "The Roman Army and Navy," in Harriet I. Flower, editor, The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge U.K. 2004) [ISBN 0-521-00390-3], pp. 67-69. For a discussion of hoplite tactics and their sociocultural setting, see Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, Alfred A. Knopf (New York 1989) [ISBN 0-394-57188-6].
^ Keegan, p. 264; Potter, pp. 69-70.
^ Keegan, p.264; Adrian Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War 100 BC ? CE200, Oxford University Press (Oxford 1996) [ISBN 0-19-815057-1], p. 33; Jo-Ann Shelton, ed., As the Romans Did: A Sourcebook in Roman Social History, Oxford University Press (New York 1998)[ISBN 0-19-508974-X], pp. 245-249.
^ Goldsworthy, The Roman Army, pp. 22-24, 37-38; Adrian Goldsworthy, Caesar: Life of a Colossus, Yale University Press (New Haven 2006) [ISBN 0300120486, ISBN 978-0-300-12048-6], pp. 384, 410-411, 425-427. Another important factor discussed by Goldsworthy was absence of legionaries on detached duty.
^ Goldsworthy, Caesar, pp. 391.
^ Between 343 BC and 241 BC, the Roman army fought every year except for five. Stephen P. Oakley, "The Early Republic," in Harriet I. Flower, editor, The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge U.K. 2004) [ISBN 0-521-00390-3], p. 27.
^ P. A. Brunt, "Army and Land in the Roman Republic," in The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays, Oxford University Press (Oxford 1988) [ISBN 0-19-814849-6], p.253; William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC, Oxford University Press (Oxford 1979) [ISBN 0-19-814866-6], p. 44.
^ Keegan, pp. 273-274; Brunt, pp. 253-259; Harris, pp. 44-50.
^ Keegan, p. 264; Brunt, pp. 259-265; Potter, pp. 80-83.
^ Karl Christ, The Romans, University of California Press (Berkeley, 1984)[ISBN 0-520-04566-1], pp. 74-76 .
^ Christopher S. Mackay, Ancient Rome: A Military and Political History, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge, U.K. 2004), pp. 249-250. Mackay points out that the number of legions (not necessarily the number of legionaries) grew to 30 by 125 AD and 33 during the Severan period (200?235 AD).
^ Goldsworthy, ‘’The Roman Army’’, p.36-37.
^ Hugh Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe AD 350-425, Oxford University Press (Oxford 1996)[ISBN 0-19-815241-8] pp. 89-96.
^ T. Correy Brennan, "Power and Process Under the Republican 'Constitution'," in Harriet I. Flower, editor, The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge U.K. 2004) [ISBN 0-521-00390-3], Chapter 2; Potter, pp. 66-88; Goldsworthy, The Roman Army, pp. 121-125. Julius Caesar's most talented, effective and reliable subordinate in Gaul, Titus Labienus, was recommended to him by Pompey. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army, p. 124.
^ Mackay, pp. 245-252.
^ MacKay, pp. 295-296 and Chapters 23-24.
^ This paragraph is based upon Potter, pp. 76-78.
^ This discussion is based upon Elton, pp. 97-99 and 100-101.
^ Guicciardini, History of Italy, 196?197; Norwich, History of Venice, 394?395.
^ Norwich, History of Venice, 399?415; Taylor, Art of War, 119.
^ Guicciardini, History of Italy, 216?227; Norwich, History of Venice, 417.
^ Norwich, History of Venice, 422?425; Oman, Art of War, 152.
^ Guicciardini, History of Italy, 280?290; Norwich, History of Venice, 429?432; Oman, Art of War, 153?154; Taylor, Art of War, 67, 123.
^ Arfaioli, Black Bands, 10?11; Guicciardini, History of Italy, 335; Norwich, History of Venice, 439; Oman, Art of War, 176?186; Taylor, Art of War, 51.
^ Smith, Italy: A Modern History, 447.
^ Smith, Italy: A Modern History, 466.
^ Walker (2003), p.19
^ Steinberg (1990), pp.189,191
^ Walker (2003) p.12
^ Bauer (2000), p.231
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